For Dodge as commander of the Forth Iowa infantry regiment, this battle was also a bit of a shake-down exercise. Things started out badly for him when a small pistol he stowed away in his greatcoat accidentally went off and thereby led to setting himself on fire. His wound and other injuries were far from serious and even a matter of levity among his friends. It later proved very painful especially while mounted and not so funny during his rush to catch up with his troops to get to the battlefield.  
According to Dodge's account yet another, later wound proved serious enough to have him removed from the battlefield by ambulance over twenty miles of washboard road. Such resulted from a shattered tree branch while being shelled by artillery knocking him from his horse. Sarcastically, Dodge felt this lead to his promotion to brigadier general. He speculated that high command upon receiving word he was a casualty, concluded the worst and believed a general's billet would be open soon thereafter and transferable to another. So, he concluded it was awarded to him as a tribute to his devotion to duty during the battle and yet would soon once again be available for someone else.  

March 8, 1862 mêlée around Elkorn Tavern(on far right, middle).
The tavern provided the eventual center for the battle's decisive phase.
Beyond question, before being wounded, Dodge's conduct in this battle impressed his commanders and even contributed to the battle's outcome. Dodge's troops happened across Van Dorn's Confederate army in the midst of their encircling movement, which he reported to Curtis, the Union army's commander. It took some convincing at a council of war on the next day, which was broken up from unexpected firing at the Elkhorn Tavern. Dodge's men ended up the day barely intact, conducting a bayonet charge after having exhausted their ammunition. Despite his wounds, Dodge's luck fared better than his mounts. Three were shot out from under him.  
Through all this the other side as well was learning the hard way. And a Confederate tactical blunder which finally decided the battle named it as well. Pea Ridge was a high ridge dividing the Confederate forces. This channeled their attacks into two independent fronts. Both attacks finally broke down due to Union superiority in interior lines of communication.  
Western Leadership would come a long way in subsequent battles and started to develop a different style of conduct in battle from their Eastern counterparts on the Union side. Western doctrine prevailed because it best exploited both within and beyond the requirements of its own theatre of war. A theatre which demanded more resourcefulness due to the longer distances and topography involved. Also improvisation due to the distribution of the conflict over this wider scope and over a more 'Balkanized' population than in the East, with loyalties which could not only be divided next door, but even within the same family. This doctrine reached maturity with Atlanta and actions beyond.  
Dodge's contribution to this doctrine obviously involved his railroad skills. But he contributed beyond this as well. After the Battle of Shiloh(April, 1862) near Pittsburg Landing in Tennessee, the issue of "contraband camps" came up. This involved slave refugees. Dodge was in the middle of all this and was finding use for such slave refugees in many different capacities. A number of them even provided otherwise unobtainable intelligence by returning behind Southern lines.
Besides putting them to work in logistics, Dodge also saw their potential use in combat, having plans to form a First Alabama Infantry(Colored) and a First Alabama Cavalry. The former especially did not sit well with Union high command back East at that time, probably because it would be a sensitive issue to border states there like Maryland. All this was way ahead of Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, which only applied to the Confederacy in any case.  
The Banding of Western Brother Commanders started with Pea Ridge. There, Dodge first met a resourceful officer, Captain Phil Sheridan, who commanded logistics for the Army of the Southwest. Sheridan would transfer East with Grant as a cavalry general and play a decisive role by pacifying the Shenandoah Valley, wresting same from its hitherto unfailing protector, Jeb Stuart.
Later in the Tennessee and Mississippi theatres, Dodge would be under the command and get to know both Grant and Sherman. Both had survived personal crises caused by the advent of war. Best summed up by Sherman's alleged but famous quip: Grant "stood by me when I was crazy and I stood by him when he was drunk, and now sir, we stand by each other always."  
Lessons Learned-- the Quick and the Dead
Whatever Dodge learned at Pea Ridge, it had little to do with his experience as a railroad engineer. Yet, Dodge's role in this battle went beyond any decisive role he may have played in it. Instead, Pea Ridge would have a far-reaching effect in shaping Dodge's later career and setting it on a new course.
Even pain catalized the learning experience here, in that it provided the convincing factor. Early on, it involved the embarrasment of a self-inflicted wound. His desparate ride to lead troops in battle while wounded was painful. More such pain was to come: three horses shot out from under him during the course of battle, followed by wounds from a falling tree causing more pain by being carted away by an ambulence over washboard road.
Just as important and far reaching were first-hand lessons from the battle. First and foremost was his discovery of van Dorn's encircling movement. In such a vast theatre involving two large rivers, Dodge could not miss the value of intelligence for enemy force disposition and movement from his 'front-row' of the battle. He saw first-hand the consequences of Curtis being nearly blind-sided to all this. Curtis being relieved of command was one of the immmediate consequences from this. Such lessons were not lost on Dodge, nor on his replacement superiors as well. Intelligence became especialy critical when Union forces were split in two with Grant's protracted seige later at Vicksburg.
Separation then of the two Union army groups and of their bases of supply involved always a daunting distance of more than a hundred miles. This was through sparsely-settled territory as the crow flies. The territory was at best contesed. At worst, it had the likes of Bedford Forrest's mounted raiders lurking within and moving at-will. Under such circumstances, good intelligence was cardinal. Given all this, Grant saw Dodge's future role as two-fold. First, Dodge at Corinth was to protect his eastern flank. Second and even more far-reaching for Dodge, his mission was expanded to gather and coordinate intelligence at the Army of the Tennesseee level. Such was to prove indispensible to him as support for the many capacities comprising his long and varied career.